Studies of Asian violence in the U.S. are rare. However, researchers report low rates of Asian violence in the early 1900s (Beach, 1932; Brearley, 1932) as well as modern times (Block, 1985) . In addition, reports from mainland China also show low (1-2 per 100,000), albeit increasing, homicide rates (Liu, et al., 2001) . In this paper, I focus mainly on homicide cases involving Chinese victims and offenders occurring in Seattle from 1900 to 1940. Although multiple social, economic, and individual-level factors influence violence, I highlight how an understanding of Chinese social organization can help explain patterns of violence in pre-war Chinatowns. Thus, I rely on Ivan Light's (1977) influential comparative and historical generalizations of Chinese participation in the vice industry to evaluate the data. In general, the findings support Light's hypotheses about the magnitude and character of violence in Seattle's Chinatown; the baseline homicide rates for the Chinese were relatively low for all of the periods studied (albeit high as compared to modern rates), with dramatic spikes resulting from conflict between Chinese tong organizations. In addition, an understanding of the organizational nature of tong groups explains why the Chinese were involved in ritualized assassinations involving multiple offenders, and why the conflicts were linked to other Chinatowns. Finally, the data conform to Light's explanation for the decline of tong violence.
TONG ORGANIZATIONS AND VIOLENCE
To understand Chinese violence, it is important to understand the types and functions of various organizations in Chinatown communities. In general, the Chinese in early 20 th century America were extremely self-reliant, and had strong self-help organizations. The ability to create and sustain effective organizations partly reflects the fact that from 1850 through the mid 1900s, the majority of Chinese immigrants came from the culturally homogenous Kwantung province with strong informal social organizations already in place (Wong et. al., 1990) . One of the most impressive achievements was the creation of the Chinese Six Companies. This organization, under guidance from China, eventually controlled most of Chinatowns' affairs. One important aspect of these organizations was their ability to arbitrate disputes, and reduce conflict between rival tong organizations. Regardless of such "peacemaking" activities, the Chinese community was by no means a place without conflict. Secret societies led to the emergence of tong organizations that also had great influence over Chinatown affairs, especially in earlier decades.
In sum, there is substantial evidence that a particular set of social organizations were brought to the U.S. by Chinese immigrants, and these likely had a great impact on patterns of violence.
1
Chinese Social Organization in Seattle's Chinatown
Three types of self-help organizations generally governed North American Chinatowns, and Seattle was no exception (Chin, 2002) . The organizations can be categorized into 1) family associations (clans), 2) district associations (common speech-district groups) and 3.) tongs (secret societies). First, family organizations incorporated Chinese with the same surnames into the local organization, with central structures often located in San Francisco. Chin (2001) describes how the local branches in Seattle operated independently from the central organizations. In general, family organizations helped new immigrants find work, and particular organizations often controlled one occupational specialization (e.g., barbers). District organizations, with ties to specific districts in mainland China, had the power to influence all of the organizations. These organizations incorporated groups of merchants with common interests.
1 Although there are numerous empirical examples of individuals rapidly creating and changing cultural rules, examples equally abound from historians and anthropologists who show cultural continuity and lags among social groups (Edgerton, 1971; Fischer, 1989; Nisbett and Cohen, 1994) . Chin (2002) discusses how this organization helped members with protection, shelter, loans, employment, settling disputes, and burial services.
Chinatown immigrants also brought with them the clan organizations (and related secret societies) that had existed for centuries in their home area of the Kwantung providence (Lamley, 1990 (Lyman, 1986) . Like other organizational bodies in Chinatown, tongs exercised authority through financial and judicial structures. The judicial wing had power to collect fines and taxes, but also to resolve disputes and issue sentences. A number of authors describe how tong organizations protected their members who were arrested for carrying out their duties (Chan, 1975; McKanna, 2002; Lyman, 1986) . Defense attorneys were hired to defend their members in court, going as far as using perjured testimonies to free their clients.
Regardless of their organizational affiliations, Chinese and even some non-Chinese who testified for the prosecution were subjected to intimidation and sometimes murdered. Similar to Italian crime organizations, Lyman (1989: p 191) suggests how "loyalty to sworn brothers was the paramount secret society value, instilled in the members through an awesome initiation ritual, and enforced with unstinting vigor."
2 Lyman (1986) discusses the origins and evolution of secret societies in China, or Triads, and how these emerged in American Chinatowns. Triad societies have a long history in China dating back as far as the Sung Dynasty (960-1279). Although debates continue about why Triads played an important role in China, there is evidence to suggest the organizations emerged among Buddhist monks in response to conflict with the Emperor. Another interpretation highlights the importance of Triad societies in providing protection to groups in a social environment with weak state protection (Chu, 2002) .
Tong organizations in the United States filled the niche of providing protection, but in being hired to defend the interests of gambling, drug, and prostitution businesses, the tongs in the U.S. became closely associated with the vice industry. It is thus unsurprising that the groups would compete for territories in U.S. cities, especially during the early 1900s when policing institutions were corrupt, and the demand for vice services was high. Gong and Grant (1930) and others have described the emergence of "tong wars" that occurred in Chinatowns from the 1850s through the 1930s. Like in other Chinatowns, tong organizations both emerged and competed in Seattle. Four major tongs emerged in Seattle (Hip Sing, Hop Sing, Suey Sing, Bing Kung), but the Bing Kung tong eventually became the most powerful.
Chinese Social Organization and Predictions about Homicide Patterns
The social organizations described above (clan, district, and tong) Chin (1996) and Lyman (1986) both discuss how institutional rules specified how to remedy disputes. In many cases, disputes were resolved peacefully through mediation mechanisms. In some cases, however, individuals who slighted the tong were condemned to death, whereby executioners or hit men were sent to carry out the sentence. This social system had potential to escalate out of control due to the "tit for tat" nature of revenge killings. Lyman (1986) describes how the murder of a tong member would often lead the victimized tong to seek out and kill the assassins, or bring them to the tribunal for punishment. Some of the Seattle newspaper articles discussing tong wars illustrated the tit for tat aspects of violence; the tongs kept score of the number of their member killed in relation to their rival tong. As a result of these rules, it was often difficult for Chinese district organizations to find resolutions to these ongoing disputes because warring parties did not want to appear that they were weak. I expected to find evidence in the Seattle data for "tit for tat" violence, and other forms of ritualized killings that reflects the institutionalized notion of honor among tongs.
Timing of Tong Violence
Light's social organizational perspective led him to find regularizes in the timing of tong violence. First, tong violence began with the emergence or rival tongs competing over the vice Light (1977: p.471) argues that although Chinese migrant communities in the U.S. had sporadic and highly violent periods of tong violence, in general the Chinese communities had very low rates of non-tong violence. In considering the causes of these low "baseline" rates, some have argued that the Confucian family effectively controlled crime in Chinatowns (President's Commission, 1967: 74) . Indeed, data on juvenile delinquency in the 1930s showed that Asian youths (mainly Chinese) from Vancouver were 15.6 times less likely to be involved in crimes as non-Asians (MacGill 1938). Others attribute importance to Chinese social organization that endowed clan elders with the legitimate power to control their members (Lyman, 1986) . Light and Wong (1975) , however, argue that one should be cautious about cultural explanations without first considering the absence of Chinese families altogether for many periods, and thus the small population of young individuals. The authors discuss how the immigration of Chinese youth in the 1960s and 1970s did lead to gang violence and crime. In sum, although cultural arguments are plausible, demographic forces may often trump such cultural forces (Waters, 1999) . Regardless of the causal mechanisms, I expected to find low homicide rates involving non-tong offenders.
Low Rates of Non-tong Violence

ANALYSES OF SEATTLE HISTORICAL DATA AND HOMICIDE CASES
In this section, I evaluate how well the Seattle data fit the historical generalizations of Chinese social organization discussed above. Data come from two main sources. First, homicide data were collected from coroners' reports as well as from descriptions of homicide cases in Seattle newspapers. An attempt was made to find all of the homicide cases, thus the dataset likely contains a high proportion of all of the cases that occurred in the years of interest. The analyses are disaggregated by ethnicity, and from the total number of cases from 1900-1950, information about the victims ethnicity is available for 94.7 percent of the cases. However, the offender's ethnicity is known in only 77.2 percent of the cases because many of these cases went unsolved by the police, and thus a suspect was never found. Although missing data are problematic, there are likely fewer missing cases that involved the Chinese. Because Chinese victims and offenders could be more easily identified by their physical characteristics, it is likely that the police and newspapers obtained and recorded ethnic information. Concerning cases related to tong organizations, many of these were high profile gun battles occurring during the day in Chinatown. As a result, it is likely that both the police and the media documented most of these events.
The second main source of data comes from historical analyses of Seattle's Chinatown and vice industry. Specifically, I rely on insightful details about Seattle's tong organizations as described by a tong interpreter named Eng Ying Gong. Tong organizations employed interpreters such as Gong to help them deal with English-speaking justice officials. Gong was hired by the Hip Sing tong in Seattle, and he provides detailed historical evidence about the competition between Seattle tongs, and such information helps explain the spikes in Seattle homicide rates among the Chinese (Gong and Grant, 1930) . In general, I find that Gong's description, as well as the case data, supports most of Light's claims.
Evaluating the Character of Chinese Violence
The vice industry flourished in the "bachelor society" of early Seattle (Berner, 1991) , and there is evidence that Chinese tongs were in control of much of this industry. With a high demand for vice, and little police intervention, 3 the Chinese became heavily involved in the vice industry. Historians highlight that the Chinese tong organizations imported and smuggled women from China into North America to work as prostitutes (Lyman, 1986 
Inter-city Tong Disputes
As expected, tong organizations often retaliated for killings or events that occurred among their chapters from different cities. Of the nineteen total tong events, twelve events precipitated from five major disputes occurring outside the city of Seattle. The first, and most dramatic dispute, occurred in 1917. Gong writes that between 1910 and 1917 the Chinese Peace Society controlled tong violence by enforcing an armistice between rival tongs (Gong and Grant, 1930) . The society at this time was headed by leaders of all the tongs, and with a neutral At the On Leong national convention in Pittsburgh, a move was made to expel the disgruntled faction. However, the process was complicated by the fact that these members had legal title to a substantial amount of the tong's property. Further, the Hip Sings were attempting to give membership to the On Leong faction members. An assassination attempt in Cleveland, and other troubles led to the buildup of tension between the groups. On October 7, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Organization attempted to get both tongs to sign peace treaties to assure all parties that no violence would occur. The leaders said that they had no power to sign As shown in Table 1 , the Chinese population like other Chinese populations in the U.S.
had severely skewed sex ratios that began to even out through time. Thus, it is plausible that the shifting sex ratio reduced demand for vice. However, there is substantial evidence to support Light's explanation, because Whites were important customers in the Seattle vice industry. Chin (2001) illustrates that in the late 1920s there was an emerging Chinese restaurant and entertainment industry oriented towards Seattle Whites. In 1923, Charlie Louie built a Chinese opera house, but soon found that booking prizefights was more lucrative. In 1929, he converted it into a restaurant and dance hall that became one of the cities more popular nightclubs, especially for White customers (Chew, 1994) . In the 1930s, numerous Chinese nightspots opened for both [Insert Table 1 ]
Evidence for Low Rates of Non-tong Violence?
In my sample, eleven cases were unrelated to tong violence. Although these rates are substantially lower than tong homicide rates, they are comparable to Black rates and far higher than the White rates. However it is important to note that two of the eleven cases occurred in ships in the port of Seattle, and were possibly less influenced by the Chinatown social organizations. Further, two cases involved offenders who were clearly insane, and another two cases involved robberies. Once disaggregated, only five cases involved disputes within Seattle's Chinatown. 5 Regardless, these data cast some doubt on Light's assertion that non-tong homicide rates were low.
To help understand the cause of these high rates, I consider why non-tong violence occurred during the early periods of the study. The relative proportion of young males in the Chinese population and the sex ratio may help explain some of the violence during these periods. Table 1 shows that there were highly skewed sex ratios among the Chinese. For example, in 1900 there were about 33 males to every one female in the Chinese community. Indeed, there is an association between the non-tong homicides and the changes in sex ratios. As the sex ratio began to even out, the baseline homicide rates fell. It is also important to consider the proportion of young males in the Chinese populations through time, but unfortunately, age-specific population data are sparse. Chew (1994) states that the median age among Chinese in the state of Washington was 45 in 1910 and 42 in 1920. He writes that the Seattle population was likely similar to the state as a whole. This pattern is at odds with the non-tong homicide data. Because there was a general increase in the number of young individuals through the 1930s and 40s, we should predict an increase in rates at these times rather than in the early 1900s. In sum, the sex ratio data correlates in the intuitive direction with changes in the non-tong homicide rates, but the likely trend of more young Chinese through time in Seattle does not.
Non-tong homicides were highest in the early years before 1910. Although the sex ratio was highly skewed, this period as compared to later periods likely had a smaller proportion of young men. To explain the contradictory demographic relationship, I speculate that social institutions, in conjunction with changes in Chinatown employment, provide a better explanation for the temporal patterns associated with the non-tong homicide data. At the turn of the century, there were few tong organizations nor a legitimate dining industry provided substantial employment. As discussed above, the restaurant industry did not emerge until the 1920s in Seattle. Although, Taylor (1994: p. 115) provides evidence that tongs provided substantial employment opportunities, rival tong organizations only arrived after 1910. Thus, after 1910
there were opportunities for men to compete cooperatively in tongs, rather than with more individualistic strategies. Further, once the restaurant industry emerged, employment opportunities improved throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In sum, it seems that the changes in
Chinese social organization directly influenced employment opportunities, and these in turn help explain the non-tong rates of violence.
DISCUSSION
With substantial historical information about Chinese social organization in both Seattle and other parts of the United States, I found that the majority of violence in the Seattle's Chinatown emerged from conflict between tong organizations. Brought with immigrants to oversea communities, the tong organizations became involved in the supply of prostitution, drugs, and gambling. The lucrative vice industry led to the formation of numerous tong organizations that often competed with each other. As detailed here, the tong organizations had links to other Chinatown organizations, and numerous dispute resolution mechanisms were intact to prevent violent conflict. However, on occasion, such mechanisms failed, and war was declared between the tongs. Such disputes led to very high homicide rates in Chinatowns across the country because of the "face-saving" nature of the organizations; appearing weak to others might invite further transgressions. In this study, tong violence continued until the organizations became more involved in the legitimate tourist trade. In addition, the tongs were likely brought under control by other organizations gaining more power from the shifting economy.
To interpret the causes of the violence, I assumed that tong organizations are founded upon complex sets of rules that influence how the groups resolved disputes both within and between organizations. Although there were few data to evidence the direct influence of organizational rules, I was able to find regular patterns of behavior in the Seattle data that conforms to more detailed historical and ethnographic accounts. In other words, most of the generalizations proposed by Light (1977) in his broad analysis of the Chinese vice industry were substantiated in a more detailed study of violence in one city. I believe such regularities were largely the result of the similar social organizations (and supporting institutional rules) that existed in most, if not all American Chinatowns. Of course, in arguing that social organizations influence violence, I do not mean to neglect other important socio-economic and demographic variables. The main purpose was to illustrate that social organizations are cultural systems that interact with other variables to influence the character, magnitude, and timing of violence. In the next section, I illustrate the benefits of first understanding the cultural systems among different communities and organizations before drawing conclusions from socio-economic data.
What Do We Gain from Empirical Descriptions of Social Organizations?
Many researchers are skeptical of paradigms that focus on cultural explanations for violence. Such criticisms are often based on the notion that data on culture (or institutional rules) are difficult to obtain, or are qualitative and difficult to operationalize in quantitative studies. In addition, some researchers find that cultural explanations lead to non-scientific explanations, or simply pulling culture out of the hat when needed to explain unexpected findings. These criticisms may be valid in some contexts, but I illustrate below the pitfalls of drawing conclusions without considering the "context" of organizations and institutions.
Ethnicity. Ethnic groups not only differ in their aggregated demographic characteristics such as per capita income, but also in their organization. In this study, there is support for Light's (1977) (Cohen, 1998) . In this case, the highly organized Chinese community had organizations that both resolved disputes (e.g., Chinese Peace Society), but also tong organizations who at times were forced to display their willingness to use extreme violence. It is interesting that the re-organization of the Chinatown economy seemed to have led to the disorganization (or at least re-organization) of the tong organizations. In sum, the data illustrates how only looking at census data could lead to problematic conclusions; the Chinese homicide rate was highest when the community was the more organized and the economy strong, and lower as the community became disorganized with White consumerism and the national and city economies plummeted.
Broader Implications
The main conclusion in this paper is that I could use historical and ethnographic generalizations of ethnic-specific social organizations to understand homicide cases in one city across four decades. Light's (1977) assumptions about social organizations and culture in general led him to conclude that different ethnic groups, with particular histories are different in their ability to deal with social problems. Just like in the San Francisco and Los Angeles, Chinese and Black immigrants to Seattle had different ways of dealing with economic hardships. Although both saw the potential gains from the vice industry, they had different organizational structures to cooperate and compete. In sum, I conclude that social organizations can be understood empirically, and implemented in violence research in an objective manner to evaluate specific expectations. Of course, the field of violence research is already moving in this direction. Baumer, et al. (2003) have recently conducted a quantitative analysis of robbery homicides using generalizations from Anderson's (1999) ethnographic description of informal "code of the streets." It turns out that Anderson's description of "honor" and rules used to both remedy disputes and protect one's status are not simply epiphenomenal or restricted to one Philadelphia inner-city neighborhood. This study is similar; early Chinese immigrants created Chinatown organizations, and these in turn patterned violence in predictable ways across place and time. 1900-04 1905-09 1910-14 1915-19 1920-24 1925-29 1930-34 1935-39 1940-44 1945-50 count per 100,000
Chinese (# Tong Events) Chinese (# Tong Offenders) Chinese (Tong Unrelated) Black White Figure 1 . Ethnic-specific Homicide Rates. Note: The rates for "tong events" are lower than "tong offenders" because of multiple offenders. In most cases, there was only one victim per event. 
